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INTRODUCTION

A class action, whenever used within the bounds of its application, effectively transforms individual rights into joint and common

ones. Whenever a separate and distinct part is small in comparison
with the whole it loses much of its significance. An individual in such
a situation loses at least part of his right to control his destiny, a right
which due process was thought to protect. Accordingly, the effect of
class actions, turning comparatively small individual rights into cornparatively large joint and common ones, has not been fully recognized
because the seemingly revolutionary consequences of that recognition
appear to be in conflict with due process.
Without an efficient mechanism to redress mass de minimus
wrongs by collecting the many small parts together, there would exist
the potential for benefit through the commission of a mass of de
minimus wrongs. By its decision in Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.,'
the Supreme Court effectively closed the doors of the federal courts
to class actions. The federal courts are usually the most appropriate
forum for such actions, because of the almost inevitable diversity between the parties. 2 One term later, the Court in Eisen v. Carlisle3
* A.B., College of Wooster, J.D., New York University; Associate Professor of Law, Seton
Hall University School of Law.
414 U.S. 291 (1973). Zahn held that every representative and every member of the class
must meet the amount in controversy requirement if there is to be federal diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). See notes 11-24 infra and accompanying text.
2 Class actions are often interstate controversies. A denial of access of the federal courts is
not a slight inconvenience, it is, in effect, a denial of the right to redress. To the extent that it
is important for individuals in diversity suits to be allowed to litigate in federal courts, class
actions developed, in part, to save time by consolidating numerous claims rather than having
them litigated seriatim. They also were intended to function as a procedural device whereby
individuals from diverse jurisdictions could mass their de minilus claims in one action in
federal court.
3 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The holding in Eisen may be succinctly stated: "Individual notice
must be sent to all class members whose names and addresses may be ascertained through
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decided that federal courts require that individualized notice be sent
to all members of the proposed class who can be identified through
reasonable effort. 4 The practical effect of this burdensome requirement is to render such mass wrongs remediless within the private
sector.
Those who believe that there should be such a mass remedy
chose poor ground upon which to fight. They proceeded against historically entrenched theories of individual rights. To have reached
contrary decisions would have seemed to the Court as undermining
the entire concept of an individualized amount in controversy for federal jurisdictional purposes and, more importantly, as expropriating
from absent individuals, without notice, an asset viewed as specific
and particular to them. The goal could have been better accomplished without making a frontal assault upon such basic concepts, and without having to create a novel theory.
Using the Zahn and Eisen cases as prototypes, this article will
endeavor to show how the goal could be met. Had the plaintiff in
Zahn framed his action so as to allege a joint and common claim
against International Paper Company (International) as a class action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) rather than as a Rule
(b)(3) class action, he could have avoided the problem of aggregation.
Had he sued in restitution rather than in tort; that is, had he sought
disgorgement of defendant's unjust gain rather than compensation for
the alleged damages caused, he would have had a joint and common
claim with the other members of the class. This also would have allowed him to avoid the aggregation barrier.
The problem in Eisen was not aggregation but notice. A higher
quality of notice is required for Rule (b)(3) class actions than is mandated under Rule (b)(1) or Rule (b)(2) actions. It has not yet been
determined whether the less demanding notice standards of Rule
(b)(1) and Rule (b)(2) violate constitutional due process. If the plaintiff

reasonable effort." Id. at 173. As to the burden of the cost of notice to the class, the Court
stated that "'[w]here, as here, the relationship between the parties is truly adversary, the plaintiff must pay for the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit." Id.
at 178-79.
Although the facts are relatively straight-forward, the history of the case and the nature of
its issues are very complex. In the ultimate Supreme Court decision, Justice Powell, in delivering the Court's opinion, repeated the characterization of Eisen, "[i]n its procedural history, at
least," as "a 'Frankenstein monster posing as a class action.'" Id. at 169 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Eisen II)). For an excellent presentation of the
case history and analysis, see Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 97
(1975).
4 417 U.S. at 173-75 (1974).
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in Eisen had framed his cause of action to allege a Rule (b)(1) rather
than a Rule (b)(3) class action, he might have avoided that higher
standard of notice envisioned by the drafters of the federal rules. This
benefit could have been secured simply by changing Eisen's pleadings from the tort analogue to restitution.
Constitutional due process, of course, may not be avoided by
such a shift in pleadings. If constitutional due process requires the
same standard for Rule (b)(1) and Rule (b)(2) class actions as it does
for a Rule (b)(3) class action, it may be necessary to avoid proceeding
in a representative capacity. Other anomalous problems arise, however, when a party seeks restitution from a mass wrongdoer solely on
its own behalf. The consideration of these problems offers insight into
the remarkable opportunities for the use of restitution and provides
even greater relief from the Supreme Court's position in this area.
The End of the Road
Although it was the Supreme Court's decision in Zahn which
erected the massive jurisdictional barrier to class actions, that decision can be viewed as an extension of Snyder v. Harris.5 Snyder
dealt with the jurisdictional amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1976) as applied to class actions involving separate and distinct
claims. 6 The Court was confronted with the issue of "whether separate and distinct claims presented by and for various claimants in a
class action may be added together to provide the $10,000 jurisdic-

5 394 U.S. 332, rehearing denied, 394 U.S. 1025 (1969).
Id. at 333-34. The claims in Snyder were presented by two unrelated cases in which a
single plaintiff sued "on behalf of himself and 'all others similarly situated.' "Id. at 333. In the
first, Mrs. Snyder was a shareholder who brought suits against the directors of a life insurance
company which had allegedly sold shares of the company's stock for grossly excessive amounts.
Under state law, plaintiff contended, the wrongfully extracted excess payments were recoverable and properly distributable among all the company's shareholders. Although lacking the requisite individual $10,000 amount for diversity jurisdiction, plaintiff sought to have her claim
aggregated with the approximately four thousand other shareholders of the company stock. Had
the district court permitted her to aggregate her claim with those of other shareholders as a
class, the amount in controversy would have been well in excess of $1,000,000. Id.
In the second case, an individual named Coburn alleged that a corporation marketing
natural gas had "billed and illegally collected a city franchise tax from [himself) and others living
outside city limits." Id. at 334. The plaintiff brought suit in federal district court based upon
diversity jurisdiction, although he "alleged damages to himself of only $7.81." Id. He sought
relief, however, on behalf of the whole class of other customers of the gas company who had
been wrongfully charged with the extra amount of tax. id. The complaint alleged that by aggregating the claims of all the overcharged customers, the action would satisfy the $10,000
jurisdictional amount. Id.
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tional amount in controversy.'7 Snyder held that aggregation of the
claims was impermissible, and that at least one member of the class
seeking federal diversity jurisdiction and Rule 23 status must have a
claim which meets the $10,000 jurisdictional amount.8 It did not
necessarily follow that the class would meet the jurisdictional requirement if one or even all of the representatives of the class met
the requisite jurisdictional standard. The Snyder Court was considering a case in which not a single member of the class alleged individual claims in excess of the $10,000 amount. 9 Under these extreme facts, the Court was able to dispose of the case without having
to articulate an immoderate rule for jurisdiction of class actions.' 0
Under the more moderate facts of Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 1 however, the Court revealed the full extremity of its position
by extending Snyder to require that every member of the class who
does not meet the amount in controversy requirement must be dismissed from the suit even though other plaintiffs allege jurisdictionally sufficient claims.1 2 In Zahn, a class action was brought against
International by four people on behalf of approximately two hundred
other individuals, all of whom owned or rented real estate on the
shores of Lake Champlain. 13 The property owners sought damages
from International for the harm done to the lake and surrounding
properties by pollutants allegedly emitted from International's New
York based pulp and paper-making plant. 14 The complaint, claiming

7 394 U.S. at 333. The Supreme Court felt a need to resolve the conflict on this issue that
had surfaced between the positions of several of the federal circuit courts. The Eighth Circuit,
in the Snyder case, 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968), and the Fifth Circuit, in Alvarez v.

Panamerican Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.) cert denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967), held that
the potential claims could not be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional requirement. 394 U.S. at
333. The Tenth Circuit, in the Coburn case, interpreted the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as intending to permit the aggregation of separate and distinct
claims for the purpose of satisfying the $10,000 amount requirement in diversity cases. Gas
Service Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831, 834 (10th Cir. 1968). See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. at
334.
that aggregation was permitted in all class actions under the amended Rule 23, and instead
concluded that the rule's amendment did not change "[t]he doctrine that separate and distinct
claims could not be aggregated," which is judge-made law. Id.
9 See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 298-99.
10 See Mattis & Mitchell, The Trouble With Zahn: Progeny of Snyder v. Harris Further
Cripples Class Actions, 53 NEBRASKA L. REV. 137 (1974).
11 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
12 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300 (1973). See Note, Class Actions and

the Need for Legislative Reappraisal, 50 NOTRE DAME LAw. 285, 287 (1974).
13 414 U.S. at 291-92.
14 414 U.S. at 292. The plaintiffs alleged that the discharge into the lake of untreated or
inadequately treated waste from International's plant caused large masses of sludge to move
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diversity jurisdiction and alleging that the representative plaintiffs had
individually suffered damages in excess of the $10,000 jurisdictional
amount, was filed in federal district court for the District of Vermont. '5 The representative plaintiffs sought to maintain the suit as a
class action under Rule 23(b)(3), on behalf of over two hundred lakefront landowners and lessees. 16 The district court determined that
while the named plaintiffs individually met the $10,000 jurisdictional
amount requirement, it was "not credible" that each member of the
proposed class suffered pollution damage in excess of $10,000.17 The
court therefore concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in
Snyder v. Harris18 precluded the jurisdiction of the district court
over any member of the proposed class who did not meet the $10,000
jurisdictional requirement. 19 A divided Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court order that the suit could
not proceed as a class action. 20 The Supreme Court affirmed, 2 1 holding that each and every plaintiff in the class action, whether named or
unnamed, whether the representatives of the class or the beneficiaries of unsolicited representation, must individually satisfy the

through the lake to the shores of the lakefront properties, rendering the property unfit for
recreational or other reasonable use and permanently diminished in value. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1034 (2d Cir. 1972).
15 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971). The complaint relied upon 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) for subject
matter jurisdiction, requiring that the matter in controversy be at least $10,000. 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(1) (1976).
16 53 F.R.D. at 430. Under Rule 23(b)(3), an action may be maintained as a class action
when the prerequisites to a class action under Rule 23(a) are met, plus when
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). For a more thorough discussion of class actions, see notes 56-112
infra and accompanying text.
17 53 F.R.D. at 431.
18 394 U.S. 332 (1969). See notes 5-10 supra and accompanying text.
19 53 F.R.D. at 431-32. The district court, however, reached its conclusion "with great
reluctance." Id. at 433. It was their concern that
the requirement that each class member meet the jurisdictional amount clearly undermines the usefulness of Rule 23(b)(3) class suits, because the problem of defining
an appropriate class over which the court has jurisdiction will often prove insuperable.
Id. The court recognized that the problem was indeed "insuperable" under the facts of Zahn,
for they could "find no appropriate class" of Zahn plaintiffs over which the court would have
jurisdiction. Id.
20 469 F.2d 1033, 1034 (2d Cir. 1972). The majority of the court was satisfied that the
district court had properly interpreted the nonaggregation doctrine of Snyder in refusing jurisdiction over the class of plaintiffs as proposed in Zahn. Id. at 1036.
21 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
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jurisdictional requirement. 22 The Zahn holding stands for the proposition that all- class actions must be dismissed if each and every
member of the class does not have a claim which meets the jurisdictional requirement of $10,000.23 This is true even if the total amount
of damages for all of the members of the class far exceeds the $10,000
24
amount.
The jurisdictional requirement examined by the Court in Zahn
has an extensive and complex history. The amount in controversy requirement has previously been interpreted to permit suits involving
multiple plaintiffs in which some or even all of the plaintiffs did not
individually have claims which met the requisite amount.2 5 In those
cases allowing aggregation, it was sufficient that the total sum of all
the claims met the jurisdictional requirement. In writing for the
majority in Zahn, Justice White felt compelled to recognize the possibility of aggregation and to explain the reasons for its inapplicability
to the circumstances of that case. Justice White described a
"dichotomy that developed in construing and applying" the requirements of diversity and federal question jurisdiction, both of which
require that the amount in controversy exceed a jurisdictional
minimum. 26 The Zahn majority sought to distinguish those multiple
plaintiff cases that had allowed aggregation from the proper treatment
of Zahn's multiple plaintiff action. In the aggregation cases, the plain-

22 Id. In dismissing the class action in Zahn, it was necessary not only to prevent the use of
aggregation but also to preclude the application of ancillary jurisdiction. In a dissenting opinion
in Zahn, Justice Brennan argued that "the practical desirability of sustaining ancillary jurisdiction" over those members of the proposed class who do not meet the traditional jurisdictional
requirements was within both the logic and policy of prior Supreme Court decisions. 414 U.S.
at 308-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also 469 F.2d at 1036-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Note, supra note 12, at 288.
23 414 U.S. at 294-95. The holding was stated succinctly: "Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3)
class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be
dismissed from the case- 'one plaintiff may not ride on another's coattails.' " Id. at 301 (quoting
the Second Circuit opinion, 469 F.2d at 1035).
24 In fact, the complaint originally filed in district court on behalf of the over two hundred
landowners and lessees sought compensatory and punitive damages in the total amount of
$40,000,000 for pollution damage to their property rights. 469 F.2d at 1034.
25 See, e.g., Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911).
'6 414 U.S. at 293-94. Justice White observed that a "classic statement" of this dichotomy
was found in Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead, where the Court stated:
When two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands, unite for
convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that the demand of each be
of the requisite jurisdictional amount; but when several plaintiffs unite to enforce a
single title or right, in which they have a common and undivided interest, it is
enough if their interests collectively equal the jurisdictional amount.
Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead, 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911).
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tiffs were seeking "to enforce a single title or right." 2 7 The plaintiffs
28
in Zahn were seeking damages for separate and distinct wrongs.
Although Justice White carefully distinguished the facts of Zahn from
a joint, common, and undivided action, there was no significant discussion of the policies behind the distinction. If the plaintiffs in Zahn
had pleaded a joint, common, and unitary action, the jurisdictional
amount requirement would not bar individual plaintiffs. It would not
be the aggregation of separate claims. The class has one joint, common, and unitary claim, one claim in which all members of the class
may have a right to share.
Eisen dealt with the very different problem of managing the adjudication of individual and severable claims. It is the possibility of
the loss of individual rights and potential defenses to each individual
claim that creates problems with Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. Rule
23(b)(3) class actions require that members of the class must be sent
the "best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members of the class who can be identified
through reasonable effort." 29 It is in recognition of such problems
that the Supreme Court has been careful to insist upon procedures
that would limit such class actions to appropriate cases. 30
In Eisen, the Court determined that it would be inappropriate to
extinguish the rights of absent class members where appropriate
notice would be theoretically possible even though infeasibly expensive. 31 Eisen sought to recover excessive fees charged to millions of
odd-lot investors in the New York Stock Market. 32 Proceeding pursuant to the Sherman Act, 33 Eisen also sought treble damages, in27

See id.

28 414 U.S. at 292. Obviously, the amount of damages suffered by each property owner in

Zahn must have varied. Even if there had been a uniform amount of pollution throughout the
lake, the effect upon the different lakeshore properties would produce differences in degrees
and kinds of damages. The properties differed as to location, size, improvements, and private
and commercial usages.
29 FED.

R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (1966).

30 See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 38-46 (1940).
•31 417 U.S. 156, 173-76 (1974). Because of the prohibitively high cost of providing individual notice and the burden imposed upon the plaintiffs to meet that cost, the remedy of the
traditional class action is not effectively available to the individual who lacks the ability to share
in the cost of individualized notice.
32 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The complaint charged that the respondents, an odd-lot
trading company and the New York Stock Exchange, had monopolized odd-lot trading and had
charged excessive fees in odd-lot transactions, in violation of antitrust and securities laws. See 41
F.R.D. at 148. "Odd-lots- are units of stock of less than 100 shares, which is the established
unit of trading. Id. The normal trading units on the stock exchanges are in multiples of 100
shares, sometimes called "roundlots." Id.

33 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
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junctive relief, and attorneys fees. On behalf of himself and all other
members of the class, Eisen claimed damages totalling one hundredtwenty million dollars. 34 He was suing on behalf of a class which was
originally believed to consist of nearly four million investors, and was
subsequently considered to be as large as six million. 35 Only two
million members of the class could be identified with reasonable ef36
fort.
It was the notice requirements of Rule 2 3(c)(2 ) that served as the
basis for the determination that Eisen's class action could not be litigated.3 7 After a long and involved procedural battle, the case was
remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the issues of notice and manageability. 3 8 The Second Circuit had recognized that maintenance of Eisen's class action was jeopardized by the
due process requirements of individualized notice as set forth in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank. 39 The district court's hearing
would have to determine which members of the class could be identified through reasonable effort so that they could receive indi4
vidualized notice. 0

34 52 F.R.D. 253, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Obviously, the damages varied with each investor,
depending upon their own particular transactions. For example, while Eisen's own claim was for
seventy dollars, the damages for the average investor was approximately six dollars. Id. at 25758. Because the action was based upon the Sherman Act, and not upon diversity jurisdiction,
the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement was not in issue.
35 Id. at 257.
36 id.
37 41 F.R.D. 147, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The rule requires "the best notice practicable" to
the class, including an explanation to the class members of the suit's binding nature unless they
specifically opt out. See id. In full, Rule 23(c)(2) reads as follows:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from
the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable
or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member
who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.
FED. R. CIv. P. 2 3(c)(2).
38 391 F.2d 555, 570 (2d Cir. 1968).
39 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The Supreme Court in Mullane stated that:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.
Id. at 314.
40 391 F.2d 555, 568 (2d Cir. 1968). The cost of mail notice was estimated at $400,000.
Eisen argued that since requiring such notice would foreclose all opportunity for relief, it should
be deemed impracticable under Rule 23(c)(2 ). Id.
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The district court determined that Eisen did not present serious
manageability problems. 41' The court emphasized the importance of
contemporary antitrust, consumer and environmental litigation in dictating a notice resolution which both protected class interests and did
not impose "an insuperable tariff on prosecution of the case." 4 2 The
court did not, however, decide the question of who should bear the
notice expense,4 3 although in dictum it indicated that if evidence
showed that Eisen could ultimately succeed, a substantial cost burden
would be borne by defendants.4 4 Judge Tyler instead ruled that a
preliminary hearing would be held to determine allocation of notice
costs.

45

At the ensuing hearing, the parties were afforded the opportunity to present evidence showing the likelihood that one party or the
other would prevail at trial.4 6 The district court, through Judge
Tyler, ruled that Eisen was more than likely to prevail on his claim
and therefore required defendants to pay ninety percent of the notice
costs, with one-half of the burden to be borne by the New York Stock
Exchange and one-half by the odd-lot dealers.4 7 Upon appeal of the
district court's order, the Second Circuit ruled that the reliance on
publication notice would be violative of the Rule 23(c)(2) requirement
of individual notice to reasonably identifiable class members. 4 8 The

41

52 F.R.D. 253, 261-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Although printing, paperwork, publication and

postage costs were revised to $500,000, the court was satisfied that the other mechanics of
administering the suit, such as estimating damages, the intervention of other class members,
and the filing of claims, were resolvable without the appointment of a special master. Id. at 263.
42 52 F.R.D. at 266-67. The district court required mail notice to two thousand members
with ten or more transactions during the relevant time period, and to five thousand members
selected at random from the approximately two million identifiable persons and firms. Id. at
267. Publication notice in the financial sections of four major New York and California newspapers was also required "once each month for two consecutive months." Id. at 268. It was
reasoned that although these notice devices were "somewhat arbitrary," they would "fairly accommodate the interests of both the class and the defendants." Id.
43 Id. at 269.
44 Id. at 270-72.
41 Id. at 271. The district court concluded that "the most efficient way for the court to
become sufficiently aware of the merits of plaintiff's claims to make a reasoned decision on the
cost of notice is to hold a preliminary hearing on the merits similar to that originally suggested
in Dolgow v. Anderson, [43 F.R.D. 472, 501-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1968)]." Id.
46 54 F.R.D. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). According to the court, if after this preliminary
"mini-hearing" it was satisfied that "the evidence showed that the ' ...
chances of ultimate
success of plaintiff and the class were sustained,' defendants would be required to pay all or part
of the costs of notice." Id. at 566-67 (quoting Dolgow v. Anderson, 438 F.2d 825, 827 (2d Cir.
1971)) (citation omitted).
47 54 F.R. D. at 567, 573. The court's order concluded that "[t]he remaining 10%, which
represents the 'hazards of litigation,' must be put up by plaintiff." Id.
48 479 F.2d 1005, 1008 (2d Cir. 1973).
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court of appeals further stated that the district court had no authority
to conduct a preliminary hearing on the merits for the purpose of
determining the proper allocation of notice costs. 4 9 In any event, the
court concluded, the entire expense should fall on Eisen as representative plaintiff. Eisen's suit was dismissed as unmanageable under
Rule 23(b)(3). 50 It was subsequent to this holding that the Supreme
Court in Eisen decided that the notice requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)
had not been met, 5 1 and that notice costs must properly be imposed
52
on petitioner and not on defendants.
The Supreme Court, by its decisions in Zahn and Eisen, has virtually removed the availability of class actions as a device for the
resolution of de rninimus mass wrongs in the federal courts. At the
core of the management dispute in Eisen was the contention that
notice procedures should not be prohibitively cumbersome.
Nevertheless, in Eisen's case the price of the privilege to litigate on
the merits would have amounted to hundreds of thousands of dollars,
even though the district court estimated Eisen's chances of prevailing
on the merits to be substantial. The Supreme Court decided that the
notice procedures of Rule 23(b)(3) required that the representatives of
the class must bear the cost burden of notifying all identifiable members of the class, despite the prohibitive effect of the cost burden and
regardless of petitioner's encouraging chances of ultimate victory.
The Deteriorationof Class Actions
If Zahn and Eisen do signify the demise of class actions, the device had already experienced substantial deterioration. The Supreme
Court's restrictive decision could not have greatly unexpected, as
Snyder v. Harris had clearly indicated the court's direction. 5 3 Class
actions have an extensive and erratic history which is reflected in

49 Id.
50 Id.
51 417
52 417

at 1015-16.
at 1016-18.
U.S. at 173-77. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
U.S. at 177-79.

53 Professor Wright has stated:
[T]he Supreme Court, which had given such a hospitable reading to the 1966
amendment of Rule 19, has considerably lessened the usefulness of amended Rule
23 by its decision in Snyder v. Harris, in which it held that the old conceptualisms

that it was sought to discard are still controlling in class actions in determining the
amount in controversy.
Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 171 (1969) (footnotes omitted). See generally Strausberg,
Class Actions And JurisdictionalAmount: Access to a Federal Forum-A Post Snyder v. Harris
Analysis, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 79 (1972).
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both legislative and judicial history. 5 4 Virtually all of the turmoil is
directed toward the problems of applying class actions and not oppo55
sition to or disagreement with the purpose of or need for the device.
The use of the class action device is not a recent development. 56 Whenever mass wrongs exist there is a need for a procedure
which will both redress the individual injuries which comprise the
mass and promote judicial economy. 5 7 Mass suits originated as an
expansion of the English equity rule which required the joinder of all
interested persons. 58 The English chancery courts permitted an action by or against representative parties where there were numerous
persons involved who shared a joint interest in the question being
adjudicated and whose interests could be adequately represented by
the named parties. 5 9 If all three conditions were met, the judgment
was binding upon all members of the group. 60 When the device was
initially adopted in the United States, however, it had no such binding effect. 6 1 Equity Rule 48, one of the earliest rules governing class

s* See, e.g., Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the
Class Action Problem, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979).

55 Class actions serve three important functions: lessening court congestion, eliminating inconsistent determinations by different courts, and providing a vehicle for redressing small injuries to numerous persons. Modern society seems to be in increasing need of the benefits of
the device. Nonetheless, the problems associated with the device have grown proportionately
with the benefits. Controversy has centered on procedural questions; namely, the adequacy of
representation, notice requirements, methods of discovery, and the common question requirement. For an early discussion of the need for class suits and their inherent problems, see
Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684
(1941). Professor Kaplan, in a discussion of the 1966 federal rules amendments, has examined
the ambiguities of the original rule 23 and the difficulties courts have encountered in applying
the rule. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 375-400 (1967). See Ford, Federal Rule 23:
A Device For Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 501 (1969).
56 Professor Chafee has traced the use of the device back as far as 1676. Z. CHAFEE, SOME
PROBLEMS IN EQUITY 201 n.6 (1950).

'7 There is a class of cases in the private sector for which we must develop a procedure to
redress certain mass wrongs, or else the individual wrongs which comprise the mass will go
unredressed. Class actions are especially appropriate when the injured are in a poor position to
seek redress, whether because they lack sufficient knowledge of their means of redress or because their means of redress are prohibitively expensive. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 55,
at 686 (1941). See also note 111 infra and accompanying text.
s Note, Federal Civil Procedure-Aggregationof Claims, 17 Lo'. L. REV. 187, 188 (1970).
59 J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 566-71 (2d ed. 1974).
Chancery was most able to effectively, inexpensively, and conveniently handle mass suits because chancery "was accustomed to [handling] polygonal controversies." Z. CHAFEE, supra note
56, at 201.
60 J. COUND, supra note 60, at 566.
61 Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 589, 590 (1974).
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actions in America, contained a clause limiting the judgment's binding effect solely to the rights and claims of present parties. 6 2 In
1912, Equity Rule 38 replaced Equity Rule 48. 63 Rule 38 allowed
one or more persons to sue or defend for the entirety where "the
question [was] one of common or general interest to many persons
constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court." 4 The new rule did not incorporate the
limiting clause, presumably to establish the decree as binding upon
65
all members of the group, including absent members.
Mass actions are both important and troublesome, not because of
the wide variety of causes of action for which they may be brought,
but because of the large number of people potentially involved. 66 Virtually all the problems of modern class actions, as well as their effectiveness, accrued after the judgment became binding upon absent
members of the class. 6 7 This ironic development results from the
conflict between the inherent benefit of class actions on the one
hand,6 8 and the need to protect those who are being involuntarily
represented on the other. Contemporary judicial concern with notice
reflects this dichotomy. 6 9
Just as the problem of notice originated early in the evolution of
class suits, so too did the concept of aggregation. 70 Aggregation is
the practice of grouping claims together in order to obtain the necessary jurisdictional monetary base. Traditionally, in an action involving
62 Equity Rule 48 provided in full:

Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest
inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the court
in its discretion may dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in
the suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all of the adverse interests of
the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly before it. But in such cases the
decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.
Id.
63 226 U.S. 629 (1912).

6 Id. at 659.

65 Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HAav. L.
REV. 874, 928-29 (1958). On the eve of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Supreme Court apparently limited the binding effect of judgments rendered pursuant to
Equity Rule 38 to absentees' interests in the property within the jurisdiction of the court. See
Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500, 505 (1938).
66 Kaplan, supra note 55, at 376.
67 Hansberry v. Lee is one of the leading cases which examined the concept of res judicata
as applicable to class actions. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
68 See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
69 See generally Dam, supra note 3.
70 Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832). The issue in Oliver, seen as one of
"great practical importance," was whether the jurisdictional minimum could be fulfilled by the
"aggregate" amount in controversy. Id. at 145.
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multiple plaintiffs each had to satisfy the requisite jurisdictional
amount in controversy. 71 The Supreme Court qualified this rhle in
Shield v. Thomas. 72 The plaintiffs in Shield were the representatives
of an intestate who sued Shield. 73 None of the individual plaintiffs
met the jurisdictional amount. 74 Nonetheless, the court decided that
the plaintiffs had a common, undivided interest in the claim. 75 The
sum due to the representatives of the deceased collectively was the
matter in dispute. 76 Therefore, the amount in controversy requirement was fulfilled. 77 Troy Bank v. Whitehead was one of the principal decisions which distinguished between those multiparty claims
which are joint and those which are separate and distinct. 78 Five
79
years later, this distinction was firmly established in Pinel v. Pinel.
The Court in Pinel acknowledged that where "two or more plaintiffs"
with "separate and distinct" claims unite in a single action "it is essential that the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional
amount," but where "several plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title
or right" in which they possess a common, undivided interest "it is
enough if their interests collectively equal the jurisdictional
amount." 8 0 This rule, which became known as the Pinel doctrine,
established that the right to aggregate varies according to the type of
class action. 8 1
By 1938 class actions were still relatively rare, certainly rare
enough to call for encouragement and support. 82 In a major effort to
effectuate mass suits, Equity Rule 38 was radically revised and incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as Rule 23.83 The
Federal Rules merged law and equity and the new class action
applied to all actions whether legal or equitable. 8 4 The Rule itself
71 Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832), is the principal case establishing this

rule.
72

58 U.S. (17 How.) 2 (1854).

73 Id. at 3.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 4.
76

Id.

77 Id.
78 222 U.S. at 40-41. The
minimum. It held that where
lien, they possess a common,
were separate .. . their claim
79 240 U.S. 594 (1916).
80 Id. at 596.
8'
82
83

court found that the sum in dispute exceeded the jurisdictional
several plaintiffs bring an action in equity to enforce a vendor's
undivided interest. "Thus, while their claims under the notes
under the vendor's lien was .. . undivided." Id. at 41.

C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 122 (2d ed. 1970).
Z. CHAFEE, supra note 56, at 199.
3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
23.01[2] (2d ed. 1976).

" id.
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set forth three distinct types of class actions: true, hybrid, and spurious. 85 A true class action existed where there was a joint and common claim among the members of the class. 8 6 It entailed a unity of
interest, such as a trust fund, between the members of the class.8 7 In
fact, the courts often determined whether true class actions existed
depending upon the "presence of a fund." 8 8 Where the cause of
action encompassed a series of separate and distinct claims on behalf
of individual class members, it was denominated either hybrid or
spurious.8 9 A hybrid class action required a mutuality of interest in
the questions involved. 90 The rights of the individual class members,
however, were several. 9 1 The spurious class suit was often viewed as
a permissive joinder device wherein numerous persons held claims or
defenses grounded in a common question of law or fact. 92 The ability to differentiate between these classifications was essential since
significant procedural consequences attached to each. 93 The matter
94
of aggregation continued to be governed by the Pinel doctrine.
Therefore, only in the true class action was aggregation permissible. 9 5 In both hybrid and spurious class suits, the claim of each class
member appearing on record as an original party had to equal or
96
exceed the amount in controversy requirement.
It was frequently arduous to apply the conceptual criteria which
distinguished these classifications to the classes seeking relief. Be85 3B

MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 83, at

23.08(1). See generally Moore,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:Some Problems Raised By the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.
REv. 551, 570-76 (1937).
'6 Rule 23(a)(1) provided that a true class action existed where the right sought to be enforced by or against the class was "joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner
of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes
entitled to enforce it." 1 F.R.D. XCIII (1941).
87 3B MooRE's

FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 83, at

23.08(1).

"' Id. In describing the various tests which were proposed to determine the existence of a
true class suit, Professor Moore states that the theory that the presence of a fund is the determinant had fallen into disrepute. Id.
89 C. WRIGHT, supra note 81, at 310.

90 Rule 23(a)(2) provided that a hybrid class existed where the right was "several, and the
object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the action." 1 F.R.D. XCIII (1941).
91

Id.

92 Rule 23(a)(3) defined a spurious class suit as one in which the right to be enforced was

"several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought." Id.
93 See, e.g., Moore and Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdictionand Effect of Judgment,
32 ILL. L. REV. 555 (1938) (binding effect of the judgment varies according to classification).
94 3B Mooisx's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 83, at

95 Id.
96 Id. at

23.13.

23.95.
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cause of this, these classifications and the distinctions upon which
they were founded failed. 97 Rule 23 was amended in 1966 in a forceful endeavor to redefine these three categories. 98 The amendments
were intended to confirm and to expand the broad scope and applicability of the class action device. 99 Three functional categories of Rule
23(b) replaced the former classifications in an effort to meet due
process concerns. 10 0 The revised rule was applicable whether the
claim or claims were legal, equitable, maritime, or a combination
thereof. 10 1 Despite observations to the contrary, there is no direct
correlation between the former true, hybrid and spurious classifications and the three functional categories contained in the revised
rule. 102 Any attempt at parallel identifications is "not only wrong but
dangerously wrong." 103
Although the Rule (b)(1) action is not co-extensive with the
former true class action, in the majority of Rule (b)(1) suits, aggregation is apparently permissible.104 It is necessary, however, to determine whether the right is a joint and common one or several. 10 5 According to the original rule, problems of aggregation are avoided only
10 6
where the members of the class share a joint and common claim.
Despite proclaimed legislative intent to enlarge the possibilities of
class actions, the courts have severely hampered expansion of the device l)v drawing analogies between the original and the revised
rules. 107

Three years after the enactment of the 1966 amendment, the
Supreme Court decision in Snyder v. Harris reaffirmed the Pinel de-

9' The cause of the failure of this classification system is best described by Professor Chafee:
"Perhaps I am color-blind with respect to class suits, but I often have a much perplexity in
telling a 'comnon' right from a 'several' right as in deciding whether some ties and dresses are
green or blue.'" Z. CHAFFE, supra note 56, at 257.
98 See Kaplan, supra note 55, at 356.
99 Id.
100 Note, supra note 61,

at 592-93.
3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 83, at
23.02-1.
102 C. WRIGHT, supra note 81, at 311.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 315-16.
1"5 Id. Despite legislative attempts to amend the rule and thereby increase its usefulness, the
concepts of joint, common and several rights have remained controlling. "'[N]o matter how
meaningless and arbitrary [the] distinction[s] may seem." Id. at 316.
106 Id. at 122.
1"7 The court in Eisen concluded that the old spurious class action corresponds to the present
101

(b)(3) suit. 391 F.2d at 565. The Court had previously applied the old terminology and its
conceptual derivation to the facts in Snyder, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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cision and applied it to all Rule (b)(3) class actions. 10 8 The Court
reasoned that aggregation of damages to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount is not permitted in spurious class actions and held that at
least one member of the class must fulfill the monetary requirement.10 9 This decision seriously limited access to such actions in the
federal courts. 110 Zahn was the next logical step in the progressive
limitation of class suits in the federal courts."' Eisen further curtailed use of the device by the imposition of costly and burdensome
notice requirements." 2
The New Direction
The legal process, like all creative processes, is often afflicted by
a failure of nerve which restricts freedom of thought. Like explorers
who are confronted by an impenetrable obstacle or an unascendable
mountain, legal theorists need not be dissuaded from their goals by
these barriers. Instead, they must create or discover other routes to
108 Id. See notes- 5-10 supra and accompanying text. It seems undeniable that the Court in
Snyder, as in Zahn and Eisen, was motivated by an underlying concern with the federal workload. See Note, Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.: Meeting the FederalJurisdictionalAmount in
Class Actions, 28 Sw. L.J. 815, 821 (1974). Pervading the consideration of all class actions is the
fear of court congestion which could result if judicial redress was, in fact, available for all causes
of action for which it is ostensibly appropriate. "The class action is at once most useful and yet
most dangerous [to judicial economy] where the individual stake is small-so small that it
would not itself justify participation in a lawsuit." 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONs 514 (1972). Many more
legitimate, though perhaps minimal, wrongs may be litigated by means of a class action that
would be litigated without the device.
This overriding concern with federal judicial economy is ironic inasmuch as the class action
device was developed, at least in part, to save time by consolidating numerous claims rather
than having them litigated seriatim. Although federal judicial economy is achieved by restricting
access to the federal courts, it is achieved at the expense of either state courts or of deserving
class members left with no forum. Judicial economy calls not for a reduction in the total number
of disputes to be resolved, but rather for the most efficient resolution of the greatest number of
disputes.
109 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
110 It resulted in the dismissal of the class suit in Snyder and eliminated any possibilities for
future expansion of the device-possibilities which had been fostered by the recent amendments to the rule.
"I Snyder held that at least one of the members of the class had to meet the jurisdictional
minimum. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). Zahn held all members of the class must meet the jurisdictional
minimum. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
Even if the jurisdictional prerequisite merely denies access to the federal courts, it is not a
slight denial. To the extent that it is important for an individual in a diversity suit to be able to
litigate in federal court, it is important for large groups of individuals to be able to do so. Class
actions are frequently interstate controversies which require a federal forum at least as much, if
not more, than most individual diversity litigation. See Note, supra note 12, at 295-96 (1974).
112 The Supreme Court in Eisen acknowledged the court of appeal's finding that "as a practical matter, the dismissal of the class action aspect of petitioner's suit was a 'death knell' for the
entire action." 417 U.S. at 162.
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their destination. Legal theorists must recognize that the Supreme
Court has erected formidable barriers to the effective use of traditional class actions. A new approach must therefore be discovered to
conquer the mountain that the traditional class action cannot otherwise ascend.
The advent of the class action was "mothered by the practical
necessity of providing a procedural device so that mere numbers
would not disable large groups of individuals . . . from enforcing their
...rights." 1 13 This practical necessity continues unabated despite
the Supreme Court's recent decisions, compelling the discovery of an
alternative route to circumvent these procedural barriers. The new
route is restitution, using the theory of disgorgement of unjust enrichment. Although the application of the theory may be new, the theory
itself is not foreign to the purposes for which class actions were designed. The prevention of unjust enrichment was one of the original
1 14
purposes behind the legislation.
It is sometimes assumed that the idea of restitution is abstruse
and that the concept resists understanding; however, nothing could
be further from the truth. The lack of clarity arises not from the concept but from the perceptual problems of the beholder. 115 Much of
the confusion surrounding the law of restitution can be attributed to
its developmental history, rather than to the complexity of its theory.
The main source of confusion is the diverse nature of the cases applying its theories, linked only by a recently recognized common principle. 11 6 The sole thread which runs through all restitution cases is
the general principle of disgorgement of an unjust enrichment. In
short, "restitution is the law relating to all claims, quasi-contractual or
117
otherwise, which are founded upon [this] principle."
While the term "restitution" is of recent origin, its concepts have
been embedded in the common law for many centuries.ll 8 In 1937

113

Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948).

114 See Note, supra note 12, at 295. "The original legislative goals in approving class actions

were fourfold: compensation of the named plaintiffs, compensation of the unnamed plaintiffs,
prevention of unjust enrichment, and deterrence." Id. (emphasis added).
115 See generally Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175 (1959).
16 Id. at 175. As Professor Dawson noted, "'[the remedies aimed at restitution of unjust
enrichment have grown like Topsy. They could be better described as a diversified litter of
Topsies, with a common parentage that was only recently discovered." Id.
117 R. GOFF & G. JONES, LAW OF RESTITUTION 5 (1966).
118 In England, most of the concepts embodied in the Restatement of Restitution are present
in the law. However, until Goff and Jones compiled the precedents into a cohesive unit in 1966,
restitution was not recognized as a body of law unto itself. See note 117 supra. The authors
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the American Law Institute published the Restatement of Restitution. 119 This brought the major concepts together for the first time,
using the element of unjust enrichment as the common factor to link
20
this diversified body of law.'
Although .the Restatement provided a conceptual nexus between
the diverse cases in this area, the legal community has yet to completely understand or accept this new branch of the law. The most
obvious explanation is that restitution has only recently been developed as a unitary body of law. When one recognizes the tender
age of restitution as compared to the field of contract law, with its
development in the eighteenth century, and tort law, with its antecedents in the nineteenth century, it is little wonder that some confusion still surrounds the subject. 12 1 Understanding and acceptance
have been further deterred due to the virtual invisibility of case law
on the subject. It has been noted that the absence of research headnotes tying the precedents together has made it difficult to find cases
on point when researching in the field. 122 Compounding the problem is the fact that courts have often applied restitution without using
the recognized terminology or developing their reasoning sufficiently.
In any event, the traditional definition of restitution succinctly states
the principle which is threaded through the history of its application. 12 3 That principle provides that "[a] person who has been un-

noted that "though all restitutionary claims are unified by principle, English law has not yet
recognized any generalized right to restitution in every case of unjust enrichment." R. GOFF &
G. JONES, supra note 117, at 13. Thus, "English lawyers are acquainted with quasi-contract, but
are unfamiliar with restitution." Id. at 3.
119 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (1937).
120 Patterson, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 1 Mo. L. REV. 223, 228
(1936).
121 Id. at 224. In his article discussing the scope of the Restatement of Restitution and its
role in American law, Professor Patterson explained:
Contracts emerged from the interstices of procedure near the close of the
eighteenth century. Torts appeared as a distinct subject matter about the middle of
the last century. It was not until the publication of Professor William A. Keener's
treatise in 1893 that quasi contracts became a recognized part of the system of
English and American private law.
Id.
122 Patterson, supra note 120, at 236. Professor Patterson concluded:
The law of quasi contracts is not a well understood subject. No digest headings
bring together its precedents. They are scattered from Abandonment to Zoning, and
only the practiced eye can pick them out. Even one who has studied the subject for
many years has difficulty in recognizing quasi contract decisions under their many
disguises.
Id.122 See J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS (1951).
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justly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitu24
tion to the other."'1
Restitution
In analyzing the remedy of restitution and its application to class
actions, the above definition provides a useful starting point. The two
key concepts are "unjustly" and "enriched." The term "enriched"
means that a benefit has been received, 1 25 which includes "any form
of advantage" which a defendant has acquired. 126 The term "unjustly" is more difficult to briefly define, since the fact that one person has benefitted from another does not necessarily mean that the
benefit was unjust. The importance placed upon the concept of "unjust" indicates that the mere receipt of a benefit is insufficient to
warrant restitution. 12 7 "[1Oinly if the circumstances of [the enrichment's] receipt or retention are such that, as between two persons, it
is unjust for him to retain it," 128 does it rise to the sufficiently culpable level which warrants restitutionary relief. 129
When an "unjust enrichment" is present, the law requires that
the wrongdoer "disgorge" his ill-gotten gains, regardless of the classification under which the action was originally brought. 130 Considering its diverse applications, 13 1 restitution provides a viable alternative to the standard damage remedy in a tort action.132 It has been
stated in general terms that damage remedies can be ignored and

1 (emphasis added).
§ 1, comment a at 12.
§ 1, comment b at 12. Comment (b) provides in pertinent part:

124 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 119, §

125 Id.
126 Id.

A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives to the other possession of or
some other interest in money, land, chattels or choses in action, performs services,
beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies a debt or a duty of the other, or
in any way adds to the other's security or advantage. He confers a benefit not only
where he adds to the property of another, but also where he saves the other from
expense or loss.
Id. See also Orwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash.2d 282, 285, 173 P.2d 652, 653 (1946).
127 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 119, § 1 comment e at 14-15.
128 Id. 9 1, comment c at 13.
129 Id.
13o Id. 9 3, comment a at 17. This is true regardless of whether the action was originally
brought as a breach of contract, tort or some other action. See id., Ch. 7 Introductory Note
9§ 128-38 at 522-26.
131 D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.1 at 137 (1973). "Restitution, when used to mean restoration, is
not a form of action, but a general description of the relief afforded. It is thus not a parallel to
terms like assumpsit, or trespass, or conversion, but a parallel to terms like damages, or injunction." Id. at 222.
132 See generally Dawson, supra note 115.
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quasi-contract used as to any kind of legal wrong from which gains are
realized. 133
In addition to its role as an alternative remedy,' 3 4 restitution
may also be used as a cause of action.' 3 5 For example, an individual
may have an unjust benefit which was not realized through a tort or
breach of contract. In such a case, the aggrieved party may sue in
restitution to have the defendant disgorge that enrichment, notwithstanding the lack of an underlying tort or breach of contract.
Often restitution is the proper cause of action when a benefit has not
been unjustly gained, but has been unjustly retained. Restitution
does not require that a wrong be committed by the person who has
received the property.13 6 This situation may be found in a case of an
honest mistake by one of the parties,1 3 7 or where an individual defaults on a contract after making a down payment.' 3 8 One court has
noted that " 't]he test is not whether the defendant acquired the
money honestly and in good faith, but rather, has he the right to
retain it.' "139

133

Id.

134 See notes 131-32 supra and accompanying text.

135 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 119, § 5. The Restatement addresses this
issue in section 5, which deals with the appropriate action at law for relief in the form of
restitution. It states that there exists:
(a) in States retaining common law forms of action, an action of general assumpsit;
(b) in States distinguishing actions of contract from actions of tort, an action of contract;
(c) in States which have statutes providing for the abolition of the distinctions between forms of actions, an action in which the facts entitling the plaintiff to
restitution are set forth.
Id.
136 Id.
137 Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 266 N.C. 467, 146 S.E.2d 434 (N.C. 1966). In Beacon
Homes, the plaintiff was suffering under a justified, yet mistaken belief that the mother of the
defendant was the true owner of several parcels of land. At the request of the defendant's
mother, the plaintiff constructed a home on the land, for which both the mother and defendant
refused to pay. The plaintiff sued in restitution to recover the amount of unjust enrichment
conferred upon the defendant. The court held that even in the case of an honest mistake the
plaintiff is entitled to restitution of the benefit conferred. Id.
138 Caplan v. Schroeder, 56 Cal. 2d 515, 364 P.2d 321, 15 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1961). In Caplan,
the plaintiff defaulted on a contract to purchase land. The court noted that the retention of said
down payment could not be allowed as liquidated damages, since there was another clause
denominated as such in the contract. Furthermore, since the defendant had resold the land at a
higher price, the money could not be retained as compensatory damages for the breach. Thus
the situation arose where the defendant had money properly received, but unjustly retained.
The court granted restitution of the down payment to the plaintiff. Id.
139 Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 266 N.C. 467, 474, 146 S.E.2d 434, 439 (1966) (quoting
Allgood v. Willmington Savings & Trust Co., 242 N.C. 506, 512, 88 S.E.2d 825, 829 (1955)).
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When the disgorgement of an unjust enrichment is sought, the
focus of a portion of the litigation is radically shifted. Actions which
seek damages for a breach of contract or a tort revolve around the
detriment suffered by the plaintiff. An action for restitution, on the
other hand, seeks to recover the quantum of enrichment obtained by
the defendant, which "in equity and good conscience" he should not
be allowed to retain. 1 4 0 In contract theory, "a person is entitled to
receive what another has promised him."141 In tort theory, "a person has a right not to be harmed by another, either with respect to
his personality or with respect to his interests in things and in other
persons." 142 In both the breach of contract or the commission of
tort, however, the culpable party may cause both injury to the
wronged party and enrichment for himself.14 3 This dual result gives
1
the injured party a choice of the most advantageous remedy. "
Often it is stated that the plaintiff must "waive the tort" before
seeking restitution of an unjust gain. This phraseology is unfortunate,
140 D. DOBBS, supra note 131, § 4.1 at 224. Professor Dobbs has noted that:

The damages recovery is to compensate the plaintiff, and it pays him, theoretically,
for his losses. The restitution claim, on the other hand, is not aimed at compensating the plaintiff, but at forcing the defendant to disgorge benefits that it would be
unjust for him to keep.
Id. (footnote omitted).
141 Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29, 31 (1938).
142 Id. at 32.
143 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 119,

Ch.

7 Introductory Note, §§ 128-38, at

522-26. In the introduction to Chapter 7 of the Restatement, which is entitled "Benefits Tortiously Acquired," it is noted that:
in all [tort cases resulting in enrichment] a typical quasi-contractual situation exists
and even though the tort actions normally produce results which are similar to
those produced by the quasi-contractual actions, the fact that the defendant was a
wrongdoer does not limit the injured party to a tort action.
Id. at 523.
14 See, e.g., Oiwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946). In Olwell,
the plaintiff sued for the restitution of an unjust enrichment. The plaintiff had sold the defendant a factory, but had retained one of the machines previously used in its operation. When
manpower became scarce the defendant took the plaintiff's machine without permission and
used it for several years, The plaintiff, notwithstanding an obvious right to sue for conversion,
chose instead to seek disgorgement of the unjust cost savings wrongfully enjoyed by the defendant. The court allowed the restitutionary recovery despite the fact that it far exceeded the
amount which would have been recoverable for the conversion. Id. In Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r,
265 Ky. 418, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (1936), Edwards discovered a cave under his property and began
to develop it as a tourist attraction. As the attraction gained in popularity, Lee, a neighbor of
Edwards, realized that a portion of the cave was under his land. Lee chose to seek restitution
from Edwards for the gains realized through the use of that portion of the cave under his land.
The court granted Lee the relief sought, although that recovery also exceeded the amount of
damages which would have been recoverable for the tort of trespass. In fact, the damages for
trespass would have been nominal, since Lee had no entrance to the cave on his property, and
therefore suffered no actual damages.
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since it gives the impression that the claimant's right to satisfaction
for the tort is being relinquished. This, of course, is not the case.
What is really waived is the right to sue for ordinary damages, as the
plaintiff has merely chosen an alternative remedy. 145 In an action for
restitution, the election of remedy does not change the essential elements of proof.' 46 "The cause of action is [still] a tort, and the tort
exists as the cause of action and must be proved as the cause of action
from first to last." 147 The elements for establishing liability remain
the same when seeking restitution for tortiously gained enrichment.
The impact of the waiver and election for restitution upon the damage portion of the trial is fundamental to the role of restitution in
class actions. When members of the class sue in tort, they are seeking
recovery for the collective damages sustained by the individual members of the class. The damages to each plaintiff are often relatively
small, thus failing to meet the jurisdictional requirements of the federal courts. On the other hand, if the class members were to "waive
the tort" and sue in restitution, the court could look toward the quantum of unjust enrichment received by the defendant to determine
whether the jurisdictional requirement has been met.' 4 While the
cases applying this principle have involved a singular plaintiff and defendant, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to
even the largest of class actions.
145 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 119, Ch. 7 Introductory Note, §§ 128-38 at

525. It is stated therein that:
A person upon whom a tort has been committed and who brings an action for
the benefits received by the tortfeasor is sometimes said to "waive the tort." The
election to bring an action of assumpsit is not, however, a waiver of a tort but is the
choice of one of two alternative remedies,
Id.
146 Corbin, Waiver Of Tort And Suit In Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221, 226 (1910). Professor

Corbin stated that "[A] tort may be waived and a suit in assumpsit maintained only when a
tort-feasor has been unjustly enriched by his tort." Id. at 226-27 (emphasis in original).
147 Id.

at 235.

'4 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 81, at 135. Professor Wright notes that several courts "have
found jurisdiction if from the viewpoint of either plaintiff or defendant more than the statutory
amount was involved.'" Id. Reasoning that since the purpose of the jurisdictional amount requirement "is satisfied where the case is worth a large sum to either party," Wright cites a case
in which the court stated:
[Iln determining the matter in controversy, we may look to the object sought to be
accomplished by the plaintiffs' complaint; the test for determining the amount in
controversy is the pecuniary result to either party which the judgment would directly produce.
Id. (quoting Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 116 F.2d 604, 606 (10th Cir. 1940). See also
Committee for F.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Berman v. Narragansett

Racing Ass'n, Inc., 414 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lally, 327 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1964); Ridder Bros. v. Blethen, 142
F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1944).
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Valuation and Measurement of Restitution
The concepts underlying restitution appear to be contractual, regardless of the nature of the action resulting in the unjust enrichment. This anomaly is due to the historical quirks in the development
of the action. At early common law there were often situations in
which an acknowledged right went remediless due to the rigid procedural nature of the existing causes of action. 1 49 The development
of assumpsit and quasi-contract was an attempt to ameliorate this
harshness by providing the needed remedy "as law advanced haltingly toward humanitarian ideals." 15 This result was achieved
through the implementation of a fiction, whereby courts found, as a
matter of law, that the defendant had made a promise to pay the
value of the unjust enrichment received. 15 1 It is obvious that no
such promise existed, 1 52 since the very nature of the restitutionarv
action precludes its existence. Hence, although courts call this fictitious promise one implied-in-law, it might more appropriately be
called an imposed-in-law promise.
Unfortunately, there is no mechanical method for ascertaining
the value of benefit unjustly conferred. Therefore, there exists no
definite way to compute the exact amount which the court "implies"
that the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff. 153 The best that
courts can do is to follow general rules of valuation utilized in various
other cases. The initial step in the valuation process is the selection of
either an objective or subjective standard. The objective standard
values the benefit conferred according to its market value, without
looking at the enrichment from the defendant's point of view. 154 The
149

Corbin, supra note 146, at 221. For a brief discussion of the historical developments and

problems surrounding assumpsit and restitution, see id. at 221-24.
150 R. NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAw, A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 11-12 (1961).
151 See generally, J. Dawson, supra note 123, at 10-26.
152 R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note 117, at 8. Professors Goff and Jones have stated that:
While the forms of action continued in existence, it is not surprising that lipservice should have continued to be paid to the notion of "implied contract," for it
was only through that fiction that quasi-contractual claims were enforceable at all in
indebitatus assumpsit . . . The abolition of the forms of action, which had for so
long provided the skeleton of the law, forced lawvers to find some new method of
classifying claims. This thev found in the dichotomy of contract and tort; and the
apparently intractable quasi-contractual claims were relegated to the status of an
appendix to the law of contract.

Id.
153 There are rare times when this does not pose a problem. Should the remedy be restitution "in specie," there is no valuation question. When there must be a translation of the benefit
into monetar, terms, however, one faces a multitude of solutions.
154 It has been explained that if an individual constructed a house upon another's property.
there are at least two feasible objective measures of restitution and one subjective
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subjective valuation, on the other hand, concerns itself with the actual quantum of benefit received by the unjustly enriched party, as
measured from the specific considerations applicable to that individual. These two approaches will obviously yield different results in
most cases, yet there is no mechanical process by which one is chosen over the other. Courts reason that one approach will be more
appropriate than the other in a given case, 1 5 5 but no one has
genuinely analyzed the cases to find the general rule for selecting one
1 56
method in any given type of case.
The difficulties of valuation, however, do not end with this selection. Once either the objective or subjective standard is chosen, a
multitude of other factors must be considered. These considerations
range from the culpability of the defendant to the nature and type of
enrichment involved, 157 be it an affirmative benefit or merely an enrichment in the form of cost reduction. 158 A case which illustrates
the various possible valuation methods of restitution is Jensen v.
Probert.159 The plaintiffs, George and Elain Jensen, resided in Port
Alexander, Alaska, and owned an undeveloped tract of land in Oregon. 6 0 In their absence and without their knowledge, another man
by the name of George Jenson conveyed this tract of land to one
Hollis Vicks by warranty deed. 161 Vicks in turn conveyed a portion
162
of this land to Samuel Probert, who built a small house upon it.

measure. These are: (1) the value of the labor and materials that went into the
house measured objectively by the market in such labor and materials; (2) the increased value of the land resulting from the addition of the house to it, whether this
is greater or less than the value of the labor and materials that went into it; and (3)
the personal value to the defendant for his particular purposes, whether this is
greater or less than the objective values.
D. DOBBS, supra note 131, at 261.

155 D. DOBBS, supra note 131, at 260. There is no rule which can apply to all of the diverse
factual situations. "If there is any one rational principle that might be used to guide restitutionar' measurements it is that the measure of restitution should reflect the substantive law purposes that call for restitution in the first place." Id.
156 The Restatement of Restitution has attempted to delineate some general guidelines to
assist courts in the preferable valuation method for some of the most common types of restitution cases. Most of these guidelines, however, are qualified by a general statement that the
recovery should be set as "justice ... requires." See generally RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION,
supra note 119, §§ 150-59.
157 D. DOBBS, supra note 131, at 278.
158 Id. See, e.g., Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946).
9 174 Or. 143, 148 P.2d 248 (1944).
160 Id. at 146, 148 P.2d at 249.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 147, 148 P.2d at 250.
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The trial court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to retain the
land and house, 163 but placed a $1,500 lien upon the land in favor of
Probert, since he had conferred a benefit upon the Jensens which it
would be unjust for them to retain. 16 4 On appeal, the court was
faced with the unusual situation wherein restitution was granted to
the defendant when both parties had admittedly acted in good faith
and without negligence. 16 5 The court was probably justified, however, in granting restitution. If the house could not economically be
removed from the property, 6 6 and the Jensens wished to keep the
land upon which the house was built, then the property should have
remained with the Jensens. 1 67 A monetary figure representing disgorgement by the Jensens of the benefit conferred upon their unimproved property from the construction of the house would seem appropriate.
Had the subjective valuation been chosen, the Jensens' situation
would be examined to determine what quantum of benefit they received from having a house on this previously vacant lot. Had they
desired to build a different structure on the site, the existing house
could in fact have been a detriment. 168 If they desired to keep that
163 Id. A similar result was reached in Somerville v. Jacobs, 153 W. Va. 613, 170 S.E.2d 805
(1969), where the plaintiffs erected a building on the defendants' land as a result of an honest
mistake. The defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiffs for the value of the building, or
alternatively, to sell the land to the plaintiff for the value of the improved property minus the
improvements. Id. at 629, 170 S. E.2d at 813. The court recognized that its determination was a
departure from traditional analysis, but felt compelled by equitable principles to prevent unjust
enrichment. Id.
16 174 Or. at 147, 148 P.2d at 250.
565 Id. at 148, 148 P.2d at 250.
166 As a matter of traditional analysis, it was irrelevant whether it was practical to move it or
not. "The most orthodox common law rule, indeed, would not even permit the improver to
remove his improvements once they had become affixed to the land, since, in logic, they had
become land itself and the property of the true owner ...." D. DOBBS, supra note 131, at
783-84. The more modern view permits more complete restitution in such cases when it is
feasible. See, e.g., Shick v. Dearmore, 246 Ark. 1209, 442 S.W.2d 198 (1969) (well digger
entitled to recover casings from well which was mistakenly installed on another's property);
Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 266 N.C. 467, 146 S.E.2d 434 (1966) (equity and good conscience
require that landowner must pay amount by which value of his property increased by construction of house mistakenly upon his land).
167 The court in the Jensen case, however, found that allowing Probert to remove the house
was a more appropriate form of restitution than placing a lien on the property in Probert's favor
for the value of the house. 174 Or. at 158-59, 148 P.2d at 254-55.
I" Although not raised by either of the parties in Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, the court
addressed this issue in dictum. It was noted that "[t]he right of a landowner to remove from his
premises a structure placed thereon by a trespasser, innocently or otherwise, and to sue the
trespasser for damages, including the cost of such removal, is not involved in this action." 266
N.C. at 473, 146 S.E.2d at 438. This language implies that had the plaintiffs sought the removal
of the home instead of restitution, they might have prevailed on other grounds.
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house, or if it were similar to the one which they were planning to
build, the value would be considerably more. In the alternative, the
court might apply the objective valuation methods. Using a "bricks
and mortar" approach, that value would be determined by the
amount Probert would have spent to have the house constructed at
the market price regardless of actual cost. 1 69 Thus, if Probert had
managed to pay less than the market price for these goods and
services he would be entitled to recover more than his actual
costs. 1 70 By the same token, had he spent more than the market
price he would receive less than his cost. 17 1 The actual costs to him
are irrelevant because he is only seeking restitution of the landowner's unjust gain and not compensation for his own losses. 172 A
second objective valuation approach, which would oftentimes yield a
very different result, would measure the difference between the market value of the unimproved property and the property as it was after
the construction of the house upon it. 1 73 Both of these objective
methods would determine the amount of recovery without regard to
the subjective benefit actually enjoyed by the Jensens.
One of the fundamental questions which remains unanswered,
however, is what happens if and when the value of the benefit conferred is greater than the enriched party can afford to disgorge. Must
the unjustly enriched landowners be required to pay that greater
amount in order to retain their property? Wrongdoers often attempt
to impose an extrinsic limitation upon the standards for measuring the
value of the unjust gain. This appeal usually requests that the recovery be limited to the quantum of detriment suffered by the aggrieved
party. Because it often appears, depending on how the gain is calculated, that a wrongdoer may have gained more, perhaps, far more,
than the amount necessary to compensate the plaintiff for the actual
damages he has suffered, such an appeal is initially very tempting. If
the law of restitution followed its contract law analogy, this would be
a very tempting proposition, since contract law awards the amount
necessary to compensate the plaintiff for the actual damages he has
suffered. 1 74 Restitutionary relief, however, does permit a plain-

169
170
171
172
173
174

See note 154 supra. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 131, at 260-65.
See D. DOBBS, supra note 131, at 260-65.

Id.
Id.

Id.
See generally, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 327-46 (1932).
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tiff to recover an award which exceeds the amount which a tort or
contract judgment would have provided for that same wrongful conduct. Restitution is not based upon the traditional contractual theory
of compensating the injured party. Instead, restitution's primary concern is that the wrongdoer be forced to disgorge his entire unjust
175
gain to the wronged party.
While a potential "windfall" recovery for the plaintiff may appear
inappropriate, it is really more moderate than the traditional damage
theory in that it limits the liability of the wrongdoer to the amount of
his unjust gain. In a tort or breach of contract, damages may far exceed the benefit enjoyed by the breaching party or the tortfeasor.
Thus it has been stated that "in no case can the recovery in assumpsit
exceed that enrichment" unjustly gained or retained by the
wrongdoer. 1 76 This potential windfall has not been without criticism
from leading commentators. 177 Nevertheless, since one of the parties
must receive a "windfall," it seems more equitable to allow the plaintiff to enjoy the excess, for restitution requires that the wrongdoer
must not keep his wrongful gain. Therefore, it is a fundamental principle of restitution that the plaintiff may be entitled to recover more

175 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 119, § 1, comment e at 14. The
Restatement's comment e provides in part that:
[there are situations, however, in which a remedy is given under the rules applicable to this Subject, where the benefit received by the one is less than the amount
of the loss which the other has suffered. In such a case, if the transferee was guilty
of no fault, the amount of recovery is usually limited to the amount by which he has
been benefitted.
In other situations, a benefit has been received by the defendant but the plaintiff has not suffered a corresponding loss or, in some cases, any loss, but nevertheless the enrichment of the defendant would be unjust. In such cases, the defendant
may be under a duty to give to the plaintiff the amount by which he has been
enriched. Thus where a person with knowledge of the facts wrongfully disposes of
the property of another and makes a profit thereby, he is accountable for the profit
and not merely for the value of the property of the other with which he wrongfully
dealt.
Id.
176 Corbin, supra note 146, at 227.
177 See, e.g., id. at 243-46. Professor Corbin persuasively enumerates the reasons why the
defendant should not be required to disgorge an amount in excess of the harm caused to the
plaintiff. Corbin asked:
[i]f the defendant puts the plaintiff in the same position, is he not square with the
world, or at least with the plaintiff? Is he not, as against the plaintiff, entitled to
keep anything else that he has obtained? Perhaps the defendant ought to be
punished for his tort, but if so the fine . . . ought to be measured by the character
of the wrong and not by the amount of the profit made out of it by the defendant.
Id. at 244-45 (emphasis in original).
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than he lost if that greater amount has been wrongfully conferred
178
upon the defendant.
Waive the Tort and Seek Restitution in a Class Action
While the barriers to class action relief imposed by Zahn have
been heavily criticized, 1 79 the response to Eisen has not been quite
so unified.18 0 The Zahn Court restricted access to judicial redress for
victims of mass wrongs in order to protect the federal courts. On the
other hand, given the binding nature of class actions, the barrier
created by Eisen might not necessarily stand for the protection of the
court calendars, but rather for the protection of unrepresented persons and their unknown interests. Accordingly, any new route circumventing the Eisen impediment may be expected to be longer and
more arduous than one circumventing the effect of Zahn.
In Zahn it was alleged that because of International's willful, intentional and unreasonable action polluting the waters of Lake
Champlain, the plaintiff and other members of the class had experienced a loss of enjoyment of their lakeside properties and suffered a
diminution in their rental values. 18 ' The plaintiff Zahn brought his
class action sounding in tort against International, seeking to recover
the damages caused by the pollution for himself and for all members
of the class. It should be noted that in both Zahn and Eisen neither
plaintiff was ever able to litigate the merits of their allegations, despite the fact that each appears to have alleged a cause of action
18 2
which on the merits had substantial prospects of success.

178 D. DOBBS, supra note 131, § 4.5 at 264; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note
119, § 1, comment e at 14. Comment (e) to the Restatement presents the situation in which

a benefit has been received by the defendant but the plaintiff has not suffered a
corresponding loss or, in some cases, any loss, but nevertheless the enrichment of

the defendant would be unjust. In such cases, the defendant may be under a duty
to giye to the plaintiff the amount by which he has been enriched.
Id.

179See generally, Developments: Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1318 (1972).
180See, e.g., Jacob & Cherkasky, The Effects of Eisen IV and Proposed Amendments of
Federal Rule 23, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1975); Dam, supra note 3; Note, supra note 12.
181 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 292 (1973). This injury was allegedly
caused by the discharge of pulp and paper making waste, and untreated and inadequately
treated domestic or sanitary sewage into Ticonderoga Creek approximately two miles from its
entry into Lake Champlain. Id.
182 In fact, after the Supreme Court had dismissed the Zahn action for the jurisdictional
defect, the State of Vermont brought suit against International and the State of New York,
alleging the same facts that the plaintiff Zahn had alleged. A consent decree was entered in
which stringent standards of pollution controls were established, to which International ultimately acquiesced. At the time, it was stated that "the controls to be imposed by the EPA
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Had Zahn chosen to waive the damage action in tort and instead
seek restitution of International's unjust gain realized through the
wrongful pollution of the lake, crucial procedural impediments would
have been overcome. Representatives of a class have the same choice
between restitution and tort as does any individual plaintiff who sues
to protect his own interests. Zahn's chances for success in a restitutionary action alleging that International obtained an unjust gain
from its wrongful acts would turn upon his ability to prove the extent
of that wrongfully obtained gain. In seeking to develop a standard of
measurement, Zahn could have sought to disgorge the costs that
International saved by not having to install the proper pollutionpreventing equipment. He also might have sought to disgorge the
amount that International saved by not having to pay to the lakeshore
property owners the reasonable value of easements to the land it was
wrongfully polluting, 183 or even all of the profits earned by the company from the operations of that particular plant under the theory
that without its polluting acts the plant could not have been operating
profitably. For the purposes of discussion, regardless of whichever
standard of measurement is applied, it will be assumed that Zahn
could have claimed and established that International's wrongful polluting acts benefitted the company $1,000,000 per year for five
years.184 Again, it must be noted that the amount in controversy in
the pleadings in restitution is the amount of the defendant's unjust
gain. The amount of damages that any individual plaintiff suffered

under the agreement were described as more stringent than those imposed anywhere else in
the nation." Bennington Banner, April 25, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
'8 An apparent difficulty in this approach lies in restitution's traditional refusal to disgorge
unjust enrichment obtained by trespass to real property. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION,
supra note 119, § 129. "Because actions based upon such acts frequently involve the question of
title thereto, and because the action of assumpsit was inconvenient for the purpose of determining such title, these rules [precluding the application of restitution] have become crystalized."
Id., § 129, comment a at 538. It was also believed that the liability for damages in tort would
normally be "as great as would exist if an action for restitution were allowed," id., thereby
minimizing the harm caused by precluding any restitutionary relief. With the disappearance of
the problems inherent in determining title, and with the clear recognition that remedies for
damages are not always sufficient, the restriction has been both criticized, see 30 MICH. L.
REV. 1087 (1932), and overruled, see Missouri Pac. Rep. Co. v. Atchison, 43 Kan. 529, 23 P.
610 (1890); Meger v. Davenport Elevator Co., 12 S.D. 172, 80 N.W. 189 (1899); Raven Red
Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 185 Va. 534, 39 S.E.2d 231 (1946). See also Edward v. Lee's Adm'r, 265
Ky. 418, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (1936); Jensen v. Probert, 174 Or. 143, 148 P.2d 248 (1944). Such an
irrational technical problem is presumably irrelevant to the Zahn analysis since the action would
have been grounded in nuisance and not trespass.
184 This figure of $5,000,000 could be established by studying the corporate books and
records of International to determine the amount of their unjust gain.
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should be irrelevant, even if the plaintiffs' individual damages were
8 5
less than the $10,000 jurisdictional amount.1
The shift of the subject of judgment from damages of the individual plaintiffs to the amount of the defendant's unjust gain is only
one result of the shift in the pleadings from tort to restitution.
Another result is that a class action pled in this manner should shift
from a Rule 23(b)(3) to a Rule 23(b)(1) class action. Rule 23(b)(1) class
actions involve joint and common interests in a unitary sum. 18 6 Accordingly, aggregation becomes irrelevant and unnecessary. Separate
and distinct class actions are brought pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), for
which aggregation is relevant but unavailable. Furthermore, since
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions require compliance with the onerous notice
provisions of Eisen, the shift in pleadings to a Rule 23(b)(1) class action, depending upon the constitutional basis of the notice procedure,
confers an additional benefit upon the representative plaintiff. The
most burdensome notice requirements apply primarily to Rule
23(b)(3) class actions, which usually involve the most diverse circumstances among the various members of the class. The more easily
complied with notice requirements of Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class
actions apply when the absent members of the class and the rep18 7 If
resentative members have the most homogeneous interests.
notice for binding litigation is not required by constitutional due
process but only by the federal rules, then changing the theory of the

185 Restitution is a single bag full of money. Everyone at whose expense it has been accumulated has an inchoate right to share in the whole. In comparison, according to traditional damage theory, each wronged party has an empty bag which he individually seeks to have filled
with the wrongdoer's money. While this conceptual distinction is highly technical, so is the
distinction upon which the theory of aggregation is based. If the technical difficulties were to be
abolished, the problems caused by aggregation would be abolished as well.

186 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).

187 Representation of unknown class members, although always troublesome, is less objectionable when the interests of the representatives closely parallel the interests of the absent
members. It has been stated that Rule 23 "does not command the giving of any notice to
members of (b)(1) and (b)(2) types of class actions, while it mandates notice in a (b)(3) type of
class .... 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 83, at 23.55. In Rule (b)(1) actions
"there will be situations where the class is cohesive or where the legal relationship of the
members enable one or more to stand judgment for all, and where the representatives are truly
representative and faithful . . . although some notice to the members may be desirable . . . a

judgment should be res judicata as to all class members, even in the absence of notice." Id.
"On the other hand, in a (b)(3) type of class suit, where notice is mandatory, there is no jural
relationship between the members. They are merely fellow travelers related only by some
common question of law or fact and with the right to opt out of the class. The mandatory notice
under (c)(2) informs them of that right." Id. See Note, Class Actions Under Rule 23(bX2): A
Type of Class Action Which Does Not Require Eisen Notice, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 504, 514
(1975).
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pleading may preclude the need for notice.' 8 8 Without the jurisdictional problems or the burdensome notice requirements, the representative of the class would be faced only with the more routine
problems inherent in the litigation of any class action, and would be
able to try to prove his case. 189
Restitution and the Mass Wrongdoer
Even if the federal rules do not require strict notice for class
actions seeking restitution, the Supreme Court may ultimately determine that due process requires that each member of the class must
receive such notice. In that case, proceeding in a class action may, in
certain circumstances, become impractical. Therefore, in order to
avoid the strict requirements of the class action, there may exist a
plausible alternative: suing mass wrongdoers in restitution in an
individual action.
Although restitution occupies a central and unique place in our
structure of rights and remedies, the familiar problem of notice may
impose great difficulties upon one who chooses to waive the tort
and sue in restitution. In order to disgorge the unjust gain, the plaintiff in an individual action may be compelled to notify all of the other
victims of the mass wrongdoer. To date, the impact of strict notice
requirements has been shown to limit the ability to use the class
action device. 190 An individual's right to plead an important cause of
action may also be limited by the strict notice requirements, thereby

588

The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether constitutional due process mandates

notice by an Eisen-type representative to members of the class. Until the Court decides the
issue, it will remain unclear. The Advisory Committee's Note to the Federal Rules indicates
that the notice is "designed to fulfill requirements of due process to which class action procedure is of course subject." 39 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1966). This formulation was based upon the
Supreme Court's decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), in which a
balancing test was employed to weigh the expense against the nature of the proceedings and the
interests involved. The Eisen Court relied on Mullane but failed to utilize its balancing test. See
Note, supra note 12, at 294. Mullane indicates that while "due process may require individual
notice in smaller class actions, it need not do so in cases like Eisen where the class is very large
and the average recovery so small." Recent Developments, Eisen Ill: Fluid Recovery, Constructive Notice and Payment of Notice Costs by Defendant in Class Action Rejected, 73 COLUM. L.
REV. 1641, 1652 (1973). The result in Eisen may have been to make stricter notice requirements
than due process demands. See Dam, supra note 3, at 110.
589 Such problems as allocating the money award and notifying unknown members of their
rights established by the class action remain, of course, whether the action is brought in tort or
in restitution, for it is a problem of practicality as well as a problem of remedy principles. See
Comment, Recovery of Damages in Class Actions, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 768 (1965).
190 See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
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immunizing the mass wrongdoer from both class actions and individual suits seeking to disgorge the unjust gain. If an individual cannot seek restitution from a mass wrongdoer without notice to the
other victims, it is because of the unitary nature inherent in the unjust gain.191 If restitution is one entire pie, how can it be divided in
order to facilitate individual recoveries? If this pie is indivisible, how
can any one victim maintain an individual action in restitution? If he
cannot, then wrongdoers are immune from a suit in restitution except
through a class action-certainly an ironic resu-lt in light of the
1 92
Supreme Court's apparent attitude toward class actions.
The only remaining choice is that an otherwise indivisible object
somehow must become divisible. If that happens, then an individual
may be able to waive the tort and sue in restitution, as an individual
plaintiff seeking damages. A representative plaintiff such as Zahn
would claim a right to recover for himself without the burden of
notifying anyone. It is readily apparent that if Zahn had sought to
disgorge the entire unjust gain of International, then the problems
relating to minimum amount in controversy and the strict notice requirement of Rule 23 could have been eradicated. The crux of such
an argument would be that the representative plaintiff is an indispensable victim of an indivisible wrong through which International
realized substantial gains. The dynamics of pollution are such that the
pollution of a lake inevitably wrongs every owner of lakeshore property. Whatever gains the polluter obtained from this wrongful conduct could not have been obtained without. specifically injuring each
individual property owner. Thus, under the facts of Zahn, the basis
for a restitutionary recovery is established. Zahn would seek to compel International to disgorge those gains that were made possible only
through injuring Zahn and his property. The fact that the gains could
not have occurred without equally wronging others does not detract
from Zahn's own indispensability.
In light of this approach to the situation, International's standing
to oppose Zahn's suit for the entire unjust gain on the basis that he
would thereby receive a windfall would be most delicate. 193 As pre-

191 The subject of such a suit, the wrongdoer's unjust gain, is a unitary sum of money. It is

the same unitary nature of the unjust gain which permits aggregation in order to overcome the
amount in controversy requirement. See notes 185-87 supra and accompanying text.
192 See Note, supra note 12, at 287, 292-96, for a discussion of the Supreme Court's current

disposition towards the modern class action.
193 International's argument that the Court would be giving Zahn money which actually belongs to others has failed in similar contexts. The Restatement of Restitution clearly states that
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viously indicated, one of the traditional considerations in electing to
seek restitution rather than compensation for the damages suffered is
that a money award in restitution may be greater than the amount
recoverable as compensation for injuries arising from the same conduct. 194 Any claim by International that Zahn should be denied the
full recovery would be especially suspect in that the inevitable consequence of that argument would be to allow the wrongdoer to retain
a substantial portion of his unjust gain.
The sound reasons permitting the disgorgement of the entire unjust gain, when the plaintiff would receive a windfall, are only
reluctantly accepted. Any windfall going to one victim out of many,
perhaps only because that victim won a race to judgment, would be
considered especially suspect. There are no general policy arguments
which support the race to judgment as a winner-take-all contest. The
focus of the inquiry, however, should not be upon the extent to
which the windfall is at the defendant's expense, for he would in any
event be required to disgorge the entire unjust gain in a successful
restitutionary action brought by a proper plaintiff. The crucial issue is
to what extent, if any, the windfall is at the expense of those victims
who might be entitled to be treated as interested parties.1 95

"[a] person entitled to possession as against the tortfeasor, although not as to other persons, is
entitled to restitution. Thus the action is not defeated by evidence that the plaintiff is himself a
converter and is not entitled to retain the proceeds as against a third person." RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION, supra note 119, § 128, comment j at 534-35. Therefore, the existence of
other potential plaintiffs is not available to International as a defense.
194

See id.

The question of interested parties is covered by Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 19 provides:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations
by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order
that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may
be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined
party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among
the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded
'95
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Zahn could first try to deny that the other victims must be included as interested parties. Although this would appear to present
an unacceptably nearsighted view of the case, plaintiffs in other cases
have succeeded in excluding comparable victims. In Jersey City v.
Hague, 19 6 Jersey City sought the restitution of money allegedly
wrongfully obtained from City employees. The allegation was that the
defendants, elected public officials of Jersey City, had received kickbacks amounting to three percent of the annual salary of each public
employee. 197 The major question presented was whether Jersey City
was the proper party plaintiff to recover the money that the defendants had unjustly obtained. Although the defendants had acquired the
money through the "voluntary" contribution of the employees after
the money was lawfully paid to each employee from the city treasury, 19 the city of Jersey City succeeded in recovering all of the unjust gain. This recovery was obtained despite the absence of the other
victims whose money had been the actual source of the unjust gain.
Another case which exemplified a court's willingness to overlook
the rights of potentially interested victims in allowing a restitutionary
recovery was Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Products
Manufacturing Co.1 99 In that case, Perfect Fit Products had knowingly and falsely represented their product as being composed of

as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what
extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or
those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the
judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will
be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall
state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in subdivision
(a)(1)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
1- 18 N.J. 584, 115 A.2d 8 (1955).
197 Id. at 588, 115 A.2d at 10.
198The payments were "voluntary" only in the respect that the defendants extorted the funds
after the employees received their paycheck rather than taking an automatic deduction from the
scheduled payment of city funds. In fact, the employees contributed under the fear of losing
their jobs if they refused. The indictment alleged that:
the defendants by force of their official positions systematically extorted from the
employees of the plaintiff municipality 3% of their official income from 1917 to 1949
as a condition of their employment and continued employment and retained these
funds for their own use.
Id. at 589, 115 A.2d at 11.
199 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1965).
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Monsanto fibers. 2 0 0 Monsanto was thusly wronged through the
trademark infringement and Perfect Fit's customers were deluded
into purchasing inferior products. The court granted Monsanto an accounting for profits, 20 1 a form of restitution. The court failed, however, to consider compensating the purchasers who were damaged2 0by
2
the defendant and from whom all of the profits had been obtained.
Even if the existence of these other victims as potential interested parties can be ignored, their rights would be diminished far
less than might be expected. It cannot be denied that if the first
among equals is permitted to seek a judgment for the entire sum of
restitution, the other victims have lost the opportunity to follow the
same course. A judgment granting a restitutionary recovery to Zahn,
however, would not in any way limit International's liability with regard to subsequent suits seeking compensation for the damage caused
by the pollution of Lake Champlain.2 0 3 International cannot claim
that it has been immunized from any further liability on the basis of
the initial suit whereby it was forced to disgorge its unjust gain. The
company would simply have lost whatever benefits it had obtained
from its wrongful conduct. Tortious wrongdoers do not have the right
to have an unjust gain as a fund from which their liability can be

drawn.

204

The defects that may arise in the attempt of Zahn to recover the entire unjust gain for himself stem from the potential rights
of the other victims to share in the restitutionary recovery. It is not at
all clear, however, that restitution, given its unitary nature, is capable
of rational apportionment. The problem lies in the fact that a money
judgment in restitution reflects only the defendant's unjust gain,
without a computation of the specific damages caused to the particular plaintiffs. Certainly, if Zahn had been the owner of all the
lakeshore property, and International had derived a benefit of five
million dollars from wrongfully polluting the property, no one would
challenge Zahn's right to seek tort damages or to recover the entire

200 Id. at 390.
201 Id. at 395-97.
202 Id.

at 396.
203 It must be noted, however, that subsequent suits must necessarily proceed in tort and

would therefore encounter the problems of notice and jurisdictional amount if brought in federal
court. This may be an important factor in the determination of which persons must be included
as interested parties. See note 195 supra.
204 If such a set-off was permissible, a wrongdoer engaged in injurious conduct from which he

failed to obtain any gain or perhaps even sustained a loss, would then be able to claim his lack
of success as a defense to a tort action or as a limitation upon damages.
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unjust gain. The fact remains that the polluter has no right to be
unjustly enriched. It would be an unacceptable result that as the
number of victims increases the way to disgorgement becomes more
arduous.
If the first party to reach judgment for restitution may not receive the other victims' "share," and if mass wrongdoers are to
be liable to disgorge their unjust gains in individual actions, then
some method to divide the indivisible must be found. A division into
smaller parts can occur only after the size of the whole has been determined. If one person sues for his portion of the unjust gain, he will
first seek to establish the total amount of the benefit and then ascertain his share. At this point it is not difficult to foresee the defendant's concerns. The defendant does not wish to be caught in a
squeeze in which different courts disagree upon the size of the pie
and apply different formulas for dividing it, thereby causing different
standards for recovery. When the plaintiff was seeking the entire pie,
the concern was to protect the other victims. When the plaintiff seeks
merely his own share, however, it is apparent that it may well be the
defendant who seeks protection. There is no compelling reason to
relieve the defendant of the burden of protecting itself. In order to
avoid the harsh and possibly conflicting results of multiple suits in
various courts, the defendant may protect itself through the use of
interpleader or, ironically, a defensive class action under Rule 23.
Therefore, the defendant would be free to protect itself from any difficulties the existence of the other victims may cause, but it cannot
shift the responsibility for its own protection to the plaintiff.
When the analysis is applied to various fact patterns it becomes
apparent for purposes of restitution that there are differences in the
relationship between mass wrongdoers and their victims which significantly affect the outcome. Zahn's class action was dismissed because not every victim "in the class had suffered pollution damages in
excess of $10,000.'" 205 By suing for restitution rather than damages,
the dismissal might have been prevented. It is apparent that each and
every victim was equally essential for any gain to have been realized
by the polluting company. 20 6 The gain, obtained at the expense of
the victims, was very likely greater, perhaps far greater, than the
victim's aggregate damages. Zahn, had he brought a class action for

205
206

Zahn, 414 U.S. at 292.
See id.
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restitution, could have argued that if the unjust gain exceeded the
aggregated damages, each victim's share of the unjust gain, being
larger than his damages, would have been more likely to satisfy the
amount in controversy.
In Eisen the unjust gain of the stock brokers was obtained by a
course of conduct significantly different from that which polluted
Lake Champlain. A series of individual acts combined to create a total
gain. Other than the fact that the wrongs from which the gain was
accumulated were part of a common scheme, the wrongs appear to be
separate and divisible. It follows that Eisen was not indispensable to
the stock brokers' total gain. Furthermore, there seems to be little
evidence that the individual wrongs produced any greater unjust
20 7
gains than they did damages.
Only if Eisen had been able to establish that each victim had
been indispensable to the total gain,2 0 8 would use of the analysis have
benefitted the class. Because the individual wrongs did not produce
any greater unjust gains than they did damages, each victim's share of
the unjust gain was equivalent to his damages. Therefore, use of the
analysis would not have helped to overcome the amount in con20 9
troversy deficiencies within the class.
Zahn's situation differed from Eisen's not only because of the
possibility of establishing a greater amount of restitution than damages, but also because Zahn's damages, unlike Eisen's, could not be
precisely determined. Although both Zahn and Eisen could have
opted to waive the damages and the class action to seek their shares
of the unjust enrichment, only Zahn was in a position to succeed.
Zahn could have avoided problems concerning the amount in controversy by looking to the wrongdoer's unjust gain rather than to the
individual damages. To do so would have been to rely on the unitary
nature of the unjust gains. While such reliance has an advantage in
that it is a means to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement,
there is a corresponding disadvantage. Such reliance increases the

207 See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 160-61.
20. Only if an across-the-board scheme in violation of the Antitrust Act may be treated as

unitary and indivisible could such an argument be made. One could reason that the violation of
the Act underlying Eisen was not that the brokers selectively violated free competition and
pricing, but that it was their consistent policy to do so. Once Eisen chose to buy in the odd-lot
market, he could no more avoid being a victim of the scheme than the scheme could make an
exception for him, each and every purchaser became an indispensable victim as long as the
anti-competitive system was in operation. See id.
209 Specifically, Eisen stood to recover $70, whether he sued for his share of the unjust gain
or for damages. Id. at 161.
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risk of involving the rights of other victims, thereby increasing the
obligation to give notice.
Whenever no one victim's share of the unjust gain meets the
amount in controversy, the unjust gain cannot be disgorged except by
a Rule 23(b)(1) class action. If this action is deemed to be subject to
due process notice requirements, then those requirements may be so
demanding as to stifle the use of the action. The drafters of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure believed that notice was not required for Rule 23(b)(1) class actions. If the unjust gains of mass
wrongdoers are not to be immunized, the Supreme Court will have
to accept the distinction within Rule 23 that the drafters created;
namely, that Rule 23(b)(3) actions require strict notice; Rule 23(b)(1)
actions do not. If the Court does not accept the distinction, then the
only alternative is to have individuals bring actions for restitution
against mass wrongdoers.
The Common Fund Doctrine
One of the forces which encourage class actions has been the
ability to recover attorney's fees. In a somewhat more modest fashion
the same inducement may exist when an individual brings an action
in restitution against a mass wrongdoer. Reasonable attorney's fees
2 10
are awarded in class actions provided the action is successful.
"Such awards represent ... [a departure] from the traditional Ameri21
can rule that no attorney's fees will be awarded in a civil suit." '
Under the "common fund" theory, a plaintiff whose suit for his share
of the unjust gain results "in the establishment of a fund for the
benefit of others besides himself may recover his counsel fees from
the common fund, thus preventing the unjust enrichment of the
other beneficiaries at the plaintiff's expense." ' 2 12 In Sprague v.
Ticonic National Bank, 2 13 the plaintiff had deposited money in a trust
fund at the Ticonic National Bank of Waterville, Maine, just prior to
the great banking collapse. 2 14 Under the trust agreement part of her

210

See Comment, Computing Attorney's Fees in Class Actions: Recent JudicialGuidelines, 16

B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 630 (1975); Comment, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After
Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 316 (1971).
211 Comment, supra note 210, 16 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. at 630.
212

Id. at 630 & n.7.

213 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
214

Id. at 162.
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fund was placed in the bank's savings department while the remain2 15
der was placed in the bank's commercial checking department.
2 16
Other individuals had established trust funds in the same manner.
The funds in the checking department were "secured by an appropriate amount of bonds set aside in its trust department as required by
Section 11(k) of the amended Federal Reserve Act .... .217
After
Ticonic was taken over by another bank and both banks went into the
hands of a receiver, Sprague filed an action in the district court
against the banks and their receiver to impress upon the proceeds of
the bonds a lien for the trust deposit. 2 18 The court sustained the
claim and entered a decree for the discharge of the lien. 2 19
Having successfully imposed a lien on the bonds to the extent of
her trust fund, Sprague moved to have her counsel fees reimbursed
from the remainder of the bonds. She claimed that "by vindicating
her claim to a lien on the proceeds of the earmaked bonds to the
amount of her trust funds, she had established as a matter of law the
right to recovery in relation to fourteen trusts in situations like her
own; that she had prosecuted the litigation at her own expense
....
-220 Her claim for attorney's fees was based solely upon the
theory that her successful lawsuit had in effect established a "common
fund," conferring a direct benefit upon those fourteen other trusts for
whom the same bonds stood as security. 22 1 Even though the cases
were separate and distinct, a benefit was conferred because the impact of stare decisis was such that by virtue of her judgment all the
other trusts became entitled to the same judgment. 2 2 2 Unless

215

Id.

216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 163.
219

Id.

220 Id. Sprague was not seeking the counsel fees from the defendant bank, but from a common fund; nor did she seek damages. Id. At no time did she profess to represent any interests
but her own. Id.
221 See Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87 HARv. L.
REV. 1597, 1601-12 (1974). The "common fund" originated in the landmark cases of Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881) and Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Petlus, 113 U.S. 116
(1885). In Greenough, the successful claim for reimbursement of attorneys' fees from the fund
was presented by the client. In Petlus, the successful claim for reimbursement of attorneys' fee
from the fund was asserted by the attorneys. Professor Dawson believes that the "common
fund" escape route from the otherwise restrictive American policy prohibiting recovery of counsel fees should be limited to the plaintiff-client, and that the doctrine should not be a means to
provide the successful attorney with an added award beyond the fees that had been negotiated
in advance with his client. Dawson, supra, at 1601-06.
222 307 U.S. at 166. Because Sprague did not bring a class action, the fund in which others
could participate was not automatically established by the decree in her favor. Id. "But in view
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Sprague was granted attorney's fees from the fund, the fourteen pas22 3
sive fund owners would be unjustly enriched by her efforts.
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, granted the attorney's fees,
224
to be paid from the fund which her efforts had created.
It follows from Sprague that if Zahn, proceeding on his own behalf, had obtained a judgment against International either for his appropriate share of the unjust gain or the full unjust gain, he would
have been additionally entitled to obtain reasonable counsel fees to
be paid out of the fund his precedent had established. Had Eisen
brought a successful suit for restitution he also would have been entitled to counsel fees. 22 5 Traditional American jurisprudence rejects the
idea of imposing the burden of the winning litigant's counsel fees
upon the loser. 226 This policy is based on the rationale "that more

of the consequences of stare decisis, the petitioner by establishing her claim necessarily established the claims of fourteen other trusts pertaining to the same bonds." Id. The Court noted
that:
Whether one professes to sue representatively or formally makes a fund available
for others may, of course, be a relevant circumstance in making the fund liable for
his costs in producing it. But when such a fund is for all practical purposes created
for the benefit of others, the formalities of the litigation-the absence of an avowed
class suit or the creation of a fund, as it were, through stare decisis rather than
through a decree-hardly touch the power of equity in doing justice as between a
party and the beneficiaries of his litigation.
Id. at 167.
22a It has been stated that "it is repugnant to fundamental principles of equity ...
that they
should reap where they have not sown." Petition of Crum, 196 S.C. 528, 533, 14 S.E.2d 21, 24
(1941). " '[E]very ground of justice' [calls] for payment by those who 'accepted the fruits' of the
labors of others." Dawson, supra note 221, at 1603.
224 Id. Justice Frankfurter's opinion explained that:
Allowance of such costs in appropriate situations is part of the historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts. The suits "in equity" of which these courts were given
"cognizance" ever since the First Judiciary Act, constituted that body of remedies,
procedures and practices which theretofore had been evolved in the English Court
of Chancery, subject, of course, to modifications by Congress . . To be sure, the
usual case is one where through the complainants efforts a fund is recovered in
which others share. Sometimes the complainant avowedly sues for the common interest while in others his litigation results in a fund for a group though he did not
profess to be their representative. The present case presents a variant of the latter
situation. In her main suit the petitioner neither avowed herself to be the representative of a class nor did she automatically establish a fund in which others could
participate. But in view of the consequences of stare decisis the petitioner by establishing her claim necessarily established the claims of fourteen other trusts pertaining to the same bonds.
307 U.S. at 164-66 (emphasis added). The net result is "to compel contribution to the litigation
1605.
costs of the client." Dawson, supra note 221, at
25
.
225 See Dawson, supra note 221, at 1606 n.
226 See Comment, supra note 210, 16 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. at 630. There are,
however, both judicial and legislative exceptions to this general principle, including the vexa-

19791

CLASS ACTIONS

litigants will be deterred by doubling the costs in lawyers' fees if they
lose than will be encouraged by the prospect that the lawsuit will cost
them nothing if they will." 2 27 None of the reasons opposing the recovery of counsel fees by the winning party are applicable when the
fees are sought not from the losing party, but from a common fund
established for non-party beneficiaries.
Fleischmann Brewing Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. 228 sharpens
the distinction between the losing party and the non-party
beneficiary. Underlying the case was a deliberate infringement of a
valid trademark arising under the Lanham Act. 2 29 Section 35 of the
Act230 enumerates the available compensatory remedies, but includes
no provision for counsel fees. While the Court did not award the
fees, it observed that a limited exception was that of the common
fund. 2 3 1 The distinction between counsel fees obtained from the losing party, forbidden in American jurisprudence, and fees obtained
232
from a non-party beneficiary, has been clearly accepted.
Had Zahn and Eisen been permitted to litigate on the merits,
and done so successfully, their precedents would have established a
fund out of which they could have asserted a claim for attorneys' fees.
Thus, Zahn and Eisen, whether suing in restitution in a representative capacity, or on their own behalf, had the potential to recover
their shares of the defendants' unjust gains as well as their attorneys'
fees.

tious conduct rule, which is simply a punitive measure, the common fund doctrine, and the
private attorney general theory. Id.
227 Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV.
849, 849 n.1 (1975).
228 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
229 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 to 1127 (1963).
230 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1963).
231 386 U.S. at 718-19. Chief Justice Warren noted that the:

exception had previously been applied in cases where a plaintiff traced or created a
common fund for the benefit of others as well as himself . . . . In that situation to
have allowed the others to obtain full benefit from the plaintiff's efforts without
requiring contribution or charging the common fund for attorney's fees would have
been to enrich the others unjustly at the expense of the plaintiff.
Id. at 719.
232 Professor Dawson stated that "[it is agreed everywhere that if a Greenough-type fund can
be found, the client can assert in his own name a claim for contribution to his costs against the
fund that his litigation has 'created, increased, or protected.' " Dawson, supra note 221, at
1606. Dawson then cited what he claimed to be an almost complete list of cases in which claims
for contribution from funds were successful. Id. at 1606 n.25.
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Conclusion
Zahn's claim, brought under Rule 23(b)(3), which does not permit aggregation of the class members' claims, was dismissed because
not every individual within the class satisfied the amount in controversy. The aggregation problem which stymied Zahn might be
prevented by bringing an action in restitution for the disgorgement of
the unjust enrichment under Rule 23(b)(1) which permits aggregation
of the class members' claims. Eisen's claim, brought under Rule
23(b)(3), which requires the representatives of the class to give strict
notice to all members, was dismissed because it was not economically
feasible for Eisen to pursue the claim given the prohibitive costs of
complying with the notice requirements. Such dismissals may be prevented by bringing a Rule 23(b)(1) action in restitution. Strict notice
is not required, if, rather than a class action, an individual action in
restitution is brought for an appropriate share of the defendant's unjust enrichment. If it is found, however, that constitutional due
process requires notice regardless of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the representative must bear the cost and burden of complying with the requirements to prevent a dismissal of the action. To the
extent that the defendant wants the protection that notice to the victims would provide, he must serve them himself.
The value of waiving the class action in tort for an individual
action in restitution depends upon one's capacity to establish his
share of the unjust enrichment as being greater than his damages.
Once established, it is more likely that the jurisdictional amount will
be exceeded. The class action is meant to be an efficient procedural
device to redress mass de-minimus wrongs. The efficiency of the device has been severely reduced by decisions resulting in onerous
notice procedures and undue restrictions on the aggregation of
claims. Had Rule 23 been interpreted in light of its purpose-to prevent unjust enrichment resulting from mass de minimus wrongsthere would be no need for a novel theory to effect its purpose.

